My Current View on the Iran Deal

Last night I met with over 400 constituents to provide an update as to my current analysis of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the potential multi-nation agreement with Iran on their nuclear program. To communicate with those who haven’t met with me yet, I’ve decided to also share my views here. Currently, regarding my vote on the Iran Deal, I remain undecided. I am treating this vote with the utmost importance and I still have more meetings to attend, more experts to consult and more work to do on the issue. From the beginning, I committed to three things – carefully read the agreement, attend numerous briefings from experts on both sides of the debate, and listen to my constituents.  Since the deal was announced, I’ve met with constituents, I’ve consulted with national security experts and current and former Administration officials, and I’ve attended multiple community meetings. I am also continuing to review the constituent correspondence and phone calls that my office receives every day. I truly believe this is a historic vote and that my decision must follow a thorough review process. 

I approach this vote with a great deal of humility. This is an incredibly important decision, one that requires both careful analysis and deep thinking on how this agreement could play out in the short and long term and how it lines up against potential alternatives. A perspective of humility says that we aren’t dealing with certainties in predicting the future, we’re dealing with probabilities.  If the history of the Middle East has taught us anything, it’s that experts on both sides – those who are hawkish in their orientation, and those who are dovish in their orientation, have generally been proven wrong, historically, when they approach a matter with absolute certainty as to its outcome. The same is true with respect to this deal in my judgment.  From the beginning, I have wanted an appropriate diplomatic solution with Iran and now that one is being proposed, I plan on being clear-eyed in my analysis.

Let’s start with our counterparty – Iran.  Iran is one of only three state sponsors of terror in the world. Iranian leadership engages in horrific rhetoric against the United States and our allies, including Israel. It is estimated that Iran spends between $5-10 billion in the region funding either terror or activities against the interests of the U.S. and our allies; and despite their assurance to the country, they have become a nuclear threshold state and have consistently lied about their intentions and actions in that regard.  While many others and I believe that there are a large number of moderate Iranian citizens who want the country to change, the leadership is what matters in these decisions, and they are not to be trusted. They are a destabilizing force in the region, actively engaged in activities against the interest of the U.S. and our allies.  And we must assume that will continue.

Based on Iran’s behavior, the U.S. was able to put in place a multi-lateral sanction regime against Iran, which has worked.  Right now, there is at least $58 billion in Iranian cash held overseas. In addition, the sanctions have reduced Iranian economy from what would have been approximately $600 billion to approximately $500 billion, according to the experts. This massive economic contraction has hurt the Iranian people. The Iranian people, not their leaders, have paid a terrible price for the policies of the Iranian leadership. 

Based on the deal, Iran will likely have access to at least $58 billion of cash within six months. Over time, the Iranian economy will also grow. Iran will integrate into the global economy, foreign investment will increase and they will have materially more financial flexibility that they have now. Integration into the world economy is critically important to Iran at this juncture, as oil prices will likely stay low and they desperately need to diversify their economy. In my judgment, and in the opinion of most of the experts, including the Administration, Iran will invest a fair amount of the money obtained from sanction relief both into their economy and into increased funding of terror and destabilizing activities, potentially as much as doubling it. 

In addition, under the terms of the deal, Iran will be able to increase their conventional weapons and the ICBM capability.  This was never supposed to be part of the deal.  In the last few months people like myself went to the Administration with several demands on things we wanted form a deal.  I wanted the American hostages held by Iran to be released.  Others wanted limits on how Iran could spend sanction relief money.  We were told by the Administration that this was a “nuclear only” deal with Iran and that other terms could not be put on the table for risk of losing the nuclear deal.  But now that the deal has been announced we realize that this is a nuclear only deal for the U.S. and our allies, but not for Iran.  I am very troubled by that.

What do we get? In my opinion, we get a strong deal for 15 years. Iran’s ability to enrich uranium and possess uranium is materially limited. After 15 years, Iran would be able to resume its nuclear program, recognizing of course, that it has pledges to never obtain a nuclear weapon. While the inspection regimes are not as tight as I and others would like it, is nonetheless very intrusive and materially better than anything we have right now. There are also snapback sanction provisions in place that have some benefits, but also some real weaknesses. We do have to acknowledge that the status quo has its own share of problems as well and the deal attempts to address them.

I believe this is an imperfect deal. While I hate to second-guess negotiators, I would have thought that we could have kept the ICBM ban in place and that we could have made the deal a 25 year deal.  The ICBM issue should be obvious - I can’t imagine how we let this get back on the table.  The advantage of a 25 year deal, aside from simply being longer, is that is pushes the nuclear decision to a new generation of Iranian leaders.  A 10-15 year deal keeps it within the horizon of the current bad actors, while a 25-year deal creates the opportunity for a more moderate leadership to ascend in Iran.  In my judgment, this would be materially better for the world and for Iran. 

I also don’t agree with the Administration’s position that if we reject this deal we have a zero probability of getting a better deal and that the only outcome is war. When a deal derails at the finish line, people get very upset, they point fingers, but if there is enough incentive, a cooler head brings all parties back to the table to try to get a better deal. I believe those facts exist here and while I certainly can’t say it’s a 100% probability that we get a better deal, it is probably a 30-50% probability.  The Administration contends that if this deal is denied, we lose the deal forever. I don’t accept that. Both Iran and our allies would continue to have a strong incentive to do a deal with the United States. If we deny the deal and the other countries go forward with Iran, every foreign company that does business in the United States will have to question whether they should in fact do business in Iran. Our laws allow for potential interpretation that could permit extraterritorial action against these companies.  Everyone will want the United States to come back to the table.

When I look at these probabilities, I believe we may have an opportunity to reject this deal and get a better deal. If we can’t get a better deal, we can always potentially return to this deal at a later date. But, as I currently analyze it, that doesn’t necessarily mean we must reject it. Rejecting the deal will have consequences, surely. We could end up with no better deal or no deal at all. Secondly, it does have implications in terms of our relationships with our partners. I am still analyzing the scenarios that are created with no deal, with this deal, or with a better deal, as well as how likely it is that each could occur.

As you can tell by my comments, I object to the notion that it is perfect deal and the alternative is clearly war.  I believe this is an imperfect deal that exists in an imperfect world. I am currently evaluating if the deal is rejected how it could be improved, how significant those improvements would be, and the likelihood of it happening as well as evaluating what the Administration can do now to make the acceptance of the admitted weaknesses of the deal more tolerable.

I owe it to my constituents to do a full review, to hear their input and to think as deeply and seriously on this matter as I can. That is my full intention as I approach this crucial vote.

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